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SOVIET CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON MILITARY TRIALS,
LONDON, 1945
By

SOLON CLEANTHES IVRAKIS*

INTRODUCTION

The study of international criminal law' has received a
new impetus with the establishment of the International
Law Commission of the United Nations (1947). Students
of international and of comparative law have noted with
interest that one of the tasks of this Commission will be
the formulation of principles of international law recognized
in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which
was adopted hy the International Conference on Military
Trials, held in London in the summer of 1945-'
At that time, the universal need for international penal
law had become even more acute due to tragic international
circumstances. These circumstances were the excesses and
atrocities committed during World War II by the European
Axis powers who had used armed force in a criminal manner. A decisive step in the direction of punishing this kind
of wickedness was, then, taken by the United Nations at
the International Conference on Military Trials (1945)
which culminated in the indictment, trial and conviction of
the major Nazi war criminals at, Nuremberg.
This Conference was a joint international venture in
which jurists from France, the United Kingdom, the United
*Diplomate Classical School, 1936, Athens College in Greece; Licenci6 en Droit, 1947, Law School of Athens University; LL.M.,
1949, Harvard Law School; Jr. Member Athens (Greece) Bar
Association.
1. See on this subject M. Engelson, Pour un Droit Penal International, 18 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL (Bulletin de
l'Association Internationale de Droit Penal) 208 (1947).
2. See Report of the International Law Commission, covering its
first session, 12 April - 9 June, 1949; United Nations, General
Assembly, Official Records; Fourth Session, Supplement No. 10
(A/925),4 (1949), Lake Success, New York.
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States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participated. The presence of a Soviet Delegation
in London was significant of the fact that the Russian
government desired to contribute its share in the creation
of a judicial process which was intended to give the form of
legal discipline to the vengeance of the victorious nations.
This essay deals in detail with the views on international
law, criminal law and criminal procedure which the Soviet
Delegation advanced and supported during the sessions of
the Conference. The often politically-determined proposals
and objections, the complicated explanations, the conciliatory counterproposals, etc. of the Soviet jurists, along with
the stand taken, at various occasions, by the American and
by the other Western Delegations, are exhaustively treated
in the text and in the footnotes. Particular care was taken
to provide lengthy explanatory expositions of the legaltechnical background on which the Russian jurists based
the development of their dialectical arguments. It is noteworthy that the essence of these Russian arguments seemed,
at times, to confuse somehow the Western international
lawyers, who were generally unacquainted with the inner
workings of the juristic mind of their Eastern colleagues
and with the legal concepts of Soviet theory, which is influenced and conditioned by Soviet political doctrine.
Soviet concepts of international law, criminal law and
criminal procedure need here special elaboration in order
to furnish the reader with the necessary background so as
to grasp the full context of the arguments advanced by the
Russian Delegation, as they have been recorded in the
minutes of the Conference.' These minutes are transcriptions
of what was said in English during the sessions of that Body.
Extensive quotations from the minutes have also been included in the footnotes, meant to illustrate and enliven the
account of Soviet legal and political reasoning. It must be
stressed here that special attention should be paid to the
development of the above-mentioned concepts, because they
consituted, from the point of view of argumentative construction, the legal matrix in which the general considera3. See ICMT.
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tions of the Russian Delegation had been formed.
It is also necessary to point out that the question of the
pros and cons, so far as the applicability of certain principals
of Soviet criminal procedure at the projected trials of war
criminals was concerned, merits some special emphasis. This
point is justified by the fact that difference of opinions at
the Conference revolved chiefly around matters affecting
the suggestible procedure at these planned trials and no
appreciable complications worth discussion developed in any
session as to substantive law.
Another matter which needs special consideration is the
interesting question of the general attitude and policy of
the Soviet Delegation at the Conference with its wide range
of psychological "impromtus" and tactical "volte-faces"
woven into the exposition of Soviet legal theory.
Soviet legal theory made its international debut at the
Conference on Military Trials. The legal men who undertook the task of explaining those of its characteristics which
were advanced during the sessions of the Conference,
represented the juridical thought of a country which-for
more than a quarter of a century-had followed lines of
development diverging basically from the cultural pattern
of the "bourgeois" Western World in all phases of public
and private life. The Russian Delegation belonged to a
juridical tradition which partook both of continental concepts of law and of the political doctrine of the Soviet Union.
Going through the minutes of the session of the Conference,
one cannot fail to observe that this second characteristic
of Soviet legal tradition constituted a directive "Leitmotiv"
which gave a particular overtone to many of the passages
in the minutes where the arguments*of the Russian Delegation have been recorded.
Too much emphasis, however, should not be laid on this
trait of Soviet legal tradition for it did not always play the
role of the all-exclusive determining and formative factor
in the shaping and rounding-off of the final Russian attitude
on a given Conference issue, after tentative Soviet views
had already been argumentatively rejected. It must be
noted here that the Russian Delegation handled the Politico-
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ideological feature of their legal tradition with a certain
degree of elasticity and moderation, whenever the Soviet
jurists felt that expedient leeway tactics were not a completely impermissible deviation from orthdox Soviet philosophy. The Russian jurists never insisted directly on the
adoption of the politico-ideological principles behind their
legal reasoning for they realized that it would not be
possible to introduce effectively such concepts at the Conference and project them on the traditional network of
international law, as conceived by their juristic colleagues,
in the present stage of the "Western-inspired" law of
nations. In the light of this consideration the Soviet jurists
often reformulated their proposals in such a manner as
to separate-so far as it was technically possible for themthe strictly legal principles of Soviet law which they considered suggestible for the general purposes of the Conference, from the basic politico-ideological elements with
which they were interwoven. This was done with the
objective of meeting the legal representatives of the Western Democracies on mutually acceptable ground.
This Soviet attitude of a certain flexibility and doctrinal
compromise proved generally to be helpful, in spite of the
fact that it was not apparent in the discussions on a number
of issues. Nevertheless, on the whole, the Russian Delegation showed a conciliatory attitude which contributed largely
to the reaching of an agreement betweeen the Eastern and
the Western world on the question of the applicable legal
method for the punishment of the principal Nazi war
criminals.
It must also be borne in mind that the members of the
Conference never lost sight of the purpose for which they
had come to London in the summer of 1945. Both the
Eastern and the Western jurists had one common objective:
the revitalization and modernization of certain concepts of
the law of nations and the laying down of realistic penal
norms of international significance.
One of the memorable features of the International Conference of London was the fact that it did not degenerate
into an arena for the airing of the conflicting views of
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Popular Democracy versus Capitalist Democracy. The East
and the West did not engage in 1945 in the controversy
which has undermined the foundations of world peace during the last five years.
What was discussed in the London Conference of 1945
was mostly law and an effort has been made here to present the Soviet contribution to the deliberations of the
Conference.
We are now in a period where the Conference and the
verdict of the International Tribunal of Nuremberg are
being subjected to speculative examination and evaluation
in retrospect.' Additional food for thought, for those who
would like to enlarge upon the subject of international
criminal law, has been provided by the very recent conviction
of a Nazi field marshal by a British Military Tribunal in
Hamburg for atrocities committed during World War II
in Russia by the troops under his command.' On the other
hand, it must be noted that German publicists have begun to
comment on and to criticize the Conference and the Nuremberg judgment,' and, also, that German requests have been
made to amnesty the surviving Nazi leaders who were convicted by the International Military Tribunal.7
4. Robert H. Jackson, Trial of the Trials: Nuremberg, 3 COMMON
CAUSE 284 ff. (Jan. 1950).
5. See Mannstein Guilty of Crimes, Gets 18 Years Imprisonment,
New York Times, December 20, 1949, 1, col. 2. See also Von Mannstein Sentence Jolts Western Germany, Christian Science Monitor,
December 20, 1949, 6. As to the carrying out of death sentences imposed in Nuremberg (1947) on a group of SS officials see New
York Times, January 27, 1950, 4, col. 4. For recent developments in
this matter see New York Times, January 10, 1951, 10, col. 4;
New York Times, February 1, 1951, 1, col. 2; and New York
Times, April 24, 12, col. 1. High Commissioner McCloy and General Handy revised 101 convictions and upheld 7 of 28 death
sentences.
6. See WILHELM GREWE, OTTO KUESTER, NUREMBERG ALs RECHTSFRAGE;

EINE DISKUSSION,

STRUTTGARTER

PRIEATSTUDIENGESELL-

SCHAFT (1947), Ernest Klett, Stuttgart. See Ibid., on 110-111,
relative German bibliography. See also Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial against the Major War Criminals and International
Law, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 223 ff. (1949).
7. See McCloy Bars Amnesty Bid for Nazi War Criminals, New
York Times, January 12, 1950, 22, col. 2.
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In the light of the above developments-given the fact
that war criminality has again come before the courts and
seems to be open for further theoretical speculation-it
appears profitable to embark upon a discussion of the
position held in legal issues involing the question of war
criminality at.the Conference by one of the countries which
participated in the establishment of the judicial process for
bringing the principal Nazi war criminals to international
justice.
I. PROBLEMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON MILITARY TRIALS AND SOVIET LEGAL THEORY

The International Conference on Military Trials** which
was held in London in the summer of 19451 could be regarded as a constructive venture to formulate international
law in penal style. This novel enterprise was enhanced by
the fact that the international jurists who assembled in
London represented the major legal systems of the world.'
**ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the text:
"ICMT" stands for Report of Robert H. Jackson, United
States Representative to the International Conference on
Military Trials, London 1945, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE PUBLICATION No. 3080 (Feb. 1949), Washington,

D. C. "Conference" refers to International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945.
1. June 26 to August 8, 1945. The International Conference on Military Trials is hereinafter cited as "the Conference."
2. The general alignment of legal systems at the Conference appeared to have had the following basic features: on the one hand
were the juristic philosophies of the Common Law countries
(United Kingdom and the United States), and, on the other,
those of the "Continental" system, namely, the legal doctrines of
France and the Soviet Union. Both these legal doctrines were
generally based on Civil Law concepts, diversified, however, by
important variations that originated from the different reception
of Roman Law in France (assimilation of the legislation of the
Western Roman Empire) and in Russia (influence and adoption
of the concepts of Byzantine-Roman Law, by way of intercourse
with the Eastern Roman Empire), and, also, so far as Russia
was concerned, from the politically-determined changes, effected
on adopted Roman Law principles since the Revolution of 1917.
See the U.S. representative's comments in Report of Robert H.
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These legal men who had been entrusted by the governments
of the United Kingdom, the Republic of France, the Soviet
Union and the United States of America to further this
undertaking, were fully conscious of the responsibilities of
their difficult task and its road-breaking implications. They
had to lay the foundations for a modern system of international criminal jurisdiction.
The majority of the international lawyers who met in
the capital of the United Kingdom realized that, in order
to reach a workable all-around understanding, they would
have to put aside hallowed legal technicalities and old-time,
strict-constructionalist views of Western vintage' so as to
find common ground to meet the standpoint of the minority,
the Soviet jurists. It was generally felt that new and unprecedented methods would have to be devised; all representatives agreed on that. The international jurists in
London understood fully that, only through the medium
of mutual concession and helpful compromise-only through
open-minded application of give and take-they would be
able to reach a universally desired objective: the creation
and adoption of a judicial process-ensuring a fair and full
hearing and providing adequate guarantees of defense-' to
Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE PUBLICATION No. 3080

(Preface)

V (Feb.

1949).

This

report is hereinafter cited at "ICMT"; John N. Hazard, Drafting
the Nuremberg Indictment, VIII AMERICAN REVIEW ON THE]
SOVIET UNION 16, 17 (March 1947).
3. Justice Jackson wrote in his report to the President (June 6,
1945; ICMT, 42, at 51) that "the legal position which the United
States will maintain, being . . . based on the common sense of
justice, is relatively simple and non-technical. We must not permit it to be complicated or obscured by sterile legalisms developed
in the age of imperialism . . . "

4. It should be noted here that the Soviet representatives put special
emphasis on the question of defense during the discussions of the
Conference (see Professor Trainin's points in ICMT, 110). The
Russian jurists stressed particularly their concept of the defendant's right to be adequately defended because they were of
the opinion that Western procedure did not offer completely satisfactory protection. Besides, they considered the trial methods
suggested by the juristic representatives of the Western Democracies as giving a predominant role to the prosecution while,
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deal with the highest surviving and captive German officials
of the collapsed European Axis, who were held responsible
for the atrocities committed during World War II.
The project was not an easy one. The juristic representatives of the Western Democracies were basically willing
to revise their attitude towards international law concepts
of traditional nature5 and readapt their mode of legal think"according to Soviet procedure, the prosecution and counsel are
exactly on equal footing" (ICMT, 269, Professor Trainin) ; Cf.
JUDAH ZELITCH, SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 247
(1931), University of Pennsylvania Press, who quoted N. V. Krylenko's (1924) identical view. Such a privileged position of the
prosecution in a trial was held by them to be a feature of the
bourgeois "contest theory" which they rejected; see J. Zelitch,
op. cit., supra, 247; and Justice Jackson in ICMT (Preface) VI.
Nevertheless, the Soviet jurists yielded in a cooperative spirit on
the equality aspect, because, as they explained, the Anglo-American approach was more widely known; see ICMT, 269. Another
point, concerning the defense, was the Soviet argument (supported also by the French Delegation) that the defendant should be
permitted to make a final unsworn statement to the court "at the
conclusion of all testimony and after summation by lawyers for
both sides; (ICMT (Preface) XI). As this was in accordance
with continental practice and no objection was raised by the American Delegation, this privilege was included in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (Art. 24 (j)); see EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT SERIES, No. 472, 3, 19 (1946),

U. S. Govt. Printing

Office, Washington, D. C., which the Conference drew up. Sidney
S. Alderman, Background and High Lights of the Nuremberg
Trial, XIV I.C.C. PRACTIONERS' JOURNAL 99, 101 (Nov. 1946).
JOHN P. KENNY, MORAL ASPECT OF NUREMBERG, 29 (1949),
Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C. Robert H. Jackson, Trial of the Trials; Nurembery, 3 COMMON CAUSE 284,291 (Jan. 1950). Judah Zelitch,

op. cit., supra, 224, wrote relatively on the matter of the "last
words" that the defendant may speak his mind "with complete
freedom and may not be interrogated or interrupted either by the
parties or by the court"; see also, ibid., 243.
5. A realistic approach to contemporary international law theory
and the problem of war was advanced by Justice Jackson in his
report to the President (June 6, 1945; see ICMT, 42, at 51-52).
Justice Jackson covered the range of a modernized law of nations
touching in particular, the question of reevaluation, reeadjustment
and evolution of international law in a cerebrated passage which
was argumentatively pivoted on due consideration of Grotian
principles. "International law," observed the American jurist,
"As taught in the Nineteenth and the early part of the Twentieth
Century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and
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ing to new circumstances and developments in a realistic
way, but there existed a certain degree of doubt as to
whether some of the precepts to be revised-although appearing to be constructively progressive in their suggestible
reformulation-might be considered by the legal representatives of the Soviet Union as being still the outgrowth
of outworn, conservative and "bourgeois-inspired" though6
in the field of international law.
is no crime at law. Summarized by a standard authority, its
attitude was that "both parties to every war are regarded as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights." This, however, was a departure from the
doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that
there is a distinction between the just and unjust war-the war
of defense and the war of aggression. International law is more
than a scholarly collection of abstract and immutable principles.
It is an outgrowth of treaties or agreements between nations
and of accepted customs. But every custom has its origin in some
single act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action
of some state. Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle
of growth for international law, we cannot deny that our own day
has its right to institute customs and to conclude agreements
that will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened
international law . . . Innovations and revisions in international
law are brought about by the action of governments designed to
meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the Common
Law, through decisions reached from time to time in adapting
settled principles to new situations." In the light of Justice Jackson's forceful conclusions one can understand the subsequent
American attitude regarding the question of the revision of
obsolescent and internationally exploited legal principles like (a)
nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lega; (b) respondeat superior;
(c) immunity of heads of state and of responsible officials of
government departments. The reformulated essence of the latter
two principles got specifically incorporated in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal; see Articles 7 and 8; ExECUTIvE
AGREEMENT SERiES, No. 472, 3, 5 (1946), U. S. Govt. Printing
Office, Washington, D. C.
6. Although the representatives of the Western Democracies did
not, in principle, object to making legal-technical revisions for
the sake of accomplishing a rejuvenation of certain concepts of
international law, and also, for the sake of facilitating the conclusion of an agreement on these issues with the Russians, they
envisaged a demarcation line as to such concessions. There were
certain matters of juristic nature which affected the equitable
process of law-both in its international and national manifestation-in which the Western jurists were not in the least inclined
to consider fundamental changes. Such, for example, was the issue
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These doubts were surely strengthened by Western consideration of the prevalent politico-ideological trends in
connection with the Soviet concept of law as a dynamic expression of the current (but variable) will of those who
Wield government power and policy,7 determined by and
coordinated with national and/or international expediency.
Due to the fact that a dominant trait of Soviet international law doctrine is its quality of being closely interwoven with a socio-political philosophy which is foreign,
and even hostile, to the Western legal theory of the law of
nations, a summary of Soviet international law concepts
appears to be necessary for the better understariding of
of the functions and poweir of judges. The concept of objective impartiality of judgeship at the planned trial of the Nazi War
criminals did not appear to appeal to the Russians. The Soviet
standpoint was that "the case for the prosecution is undoubtedly
known to the judge before the trial starts and there is, therefore, no necessity to create a sort of fiction that the judge is a
disinterested person who has no legal knowledge of what has
happened before. If such procedure is adopted that the judge is
supposed to be impartial, it would lead to unnecessary delays... "
Another point was the envisaged functional interdependence of
prosecutor and judge; "the prosecution would assist the judge,
and there would be no question that the judge has the character
of an impartial person." ICMT, Explanation of Soviet Memorandum; 104, at 105, 106. See generally Note 36.
7. A. Y. Vishinski puts this consideration into an argumentative
nutshell during a session of the ad hoc Political Committee of the
UN Gen. Assembly (1948) (summary record of the 7th meeting,
Nov. 22, 1948). According to this Soviet jurist "law was in the
last analysis nothing but the implementation of policy." Vishinski
also maintained that political considerations could not be divorced from strictly legal conditions; see United Nations, General
Assembly, 3rd Session, Doc. A/AC. 24/SR 7, 23 November, 1948,
5 and 6.
An identical view-though with a different motivation-has
been expressed in relation to the second of Vishinsky's points by
a non-Soviet jurist Judge A. Alvarez (Chile) of the International
Court of Justice, in his concurring opinion in the matter of the
conditions of admission of a state to membership in the United
Nations. The Chilean jurist elaborated on the interplay and
interconnection of legal and political issues in post-World-War-II
international law. See Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice, May 28, 1948; Reports on Judgments, Advisory
Opinions and Orders, 57 ff. (1948). See also 2 INT'L L. Q. 483,
492 ff. (1948).
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certain discordances and also-in a way-of the achieved
harmonies at the Conference.
II. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
It could be said that the Soviet attitude towards "Western" international law is determined by a partial rejection
of its institutions. The reason for this is the now prevalent
notion in Russia that international law-in its present-day
development-is considered by Soviet legal theorists as a
product of "bourgeois" juridical thought' and therefore
open to socialist criticism. Consequently, the legal-technical
approach of the Soviet jurists has generally been eclectic
in the acceptance of international law norms. This attitude,
however, did not wholly preclude the temporary reception
of essentially bourgeois international law concepts for reasons of political convenience' in spite of the fact that they
8. Cf. Sergei B. Krylov: Les notions pi-incipales du droit des gens;
La doctrine sovietique du droit international, in RECUEIL DES
COURS, Academie de droit international de la Haye, 1947, Vol. I,
411, at 433: "Il va sans dire que I'USSR ne peut que rejeter
une partie des institutions du droit international bourgeois."
S. B. Krylov is the Russian representative in the International
Court of Justice. Among the examples of "bourgeois" international law institutions which S. B. Krylov considered objectionable is the "diminutio" of the sovereignty of a country which
has "granted" capitulations to another, and, the matter of international relations between two states on the basis of a bilateral
treaty which imposes unequal obligations to one party; see S. B.
Krylov. op. cit., supra, 433, 434.
The Russian approach to "bourgeois" international law was
summed up by Justice R. H. Jackson as follows: "While the
Soviet authorities accept the reality and the binding force of
international law in general, they do not submit themselves to
the general mass of customary law deduced from the practice
of Western States." See ICMT (Preface), VI.
9. Eugene A. Korovin is reported as admitting that "a certain body
of rules could be acceptable to.. the bourgeois states and the
Soviet one" with a reservation as to the time limit of applicability so far as the USSR was concerned. See Mintauts Chakste
(former Justice of the Supreme Court of Latvia), Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty, 43 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 21, 30 (1949).
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were not in conformity with Soviet legal philosophy. Soviet
international lawyers do not detect a doctrinal inconsistency
in this. The "middle-class-inspired" Law of Nations is
viewed by the Soviets as a temporary medium of intercourse,
a general pattern of rules, regulating the international relations of the Soviet Socialist Republics with the Bourgeois
Democracies." Soviet jurists assume that international law
has sociologically and historically ephemeral qualities due
to its origin." They claim that international law-or, rather,
10. This standpoint is based on the Marxist assumption that the

"reactionary-imperialist" characteristics of international law will
eventually be superseded by non-capitalist conceptions which will
impose themselves universally through the forceful impact of the
anti-bourgeois world and its progressive, proletarian ideas on
middle class world order. See Philip M. Brown, The Russian
Soviet Union and the Law of Nations, 28 AM. J. INT'L. L. 733
(1934), as to some speculations on the revolutionary Russian concept of the world under exclusively one international law system.
The evaluative criterions applied in the solving of international
law questions, involving contacts with the countries of the socalled "bourgeois encirclement," partake of Marxist and LeninStalinist theory; see generally John N. Hazard, The Soviet Union
and InternationalLaw, 43 ILL. L. REV. 591, 592 (1948), and M.
Chakste, loc. cit., supra, 22. Besides, the Marx-Angelian concept
of law (see 1 VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 164 (1948),
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor as a juridical
superstructure over material potentialities, finds its projection
on the field of global economic values in Soviet international law
theory where the law of nations is considered as such a legaltechnical superstructure, S. B. Krylov, op. cit., supra, 417, wrote
in this connection: "Le droit international ou interetatique doit...
etre defini comme une superstructure juridique edifice sur I' economie mondiale, representant la fixation des resultats de l'emulation et de la cooperation entre les classes dominantes de differents
Etats dans leurs rapports externes, internationaux."
11. Mintauts Chakste in his article Soviet Concepts of State, International Law and Sovereignty, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 21, 26 (1949),
quoted Eugene A. Korovin's definition of international law
and noted that the Soviet jurists put emphasis on the "class
character" of the law of nations: "International public law is
the sum total of legal norms governing rights and duties of collectivities of the ruling classes-participants in international
intercourse." These legal norms, regulating international intercourse in general, and that between the USSR and the noncommunist countries, in particular, are classed as a "temporal
phenomenon" which will come to an end with the proletarian
world revolution. The acknowledgment of the existence (in con-
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"interstate law"---which is governing the external, international, contacts between the ruling classes of different
states, is a juridical phenomenon of what Korovin calls the
"transitional epoch." 13 This period is chronologically assumed to precede the decline and final disolution of the
capitalist order.
It is interesting to note that the Soviet legal therorists
on visage an international legal order for this period of
"transition" which is not devoid of a certain amount of
stability and certainty in relation to treaties and international agreements with the capitalist states. It must be borne
in mind, however, that the Soviet Russians understand this
international legal order in terms of an underlying assumption which is not nurtured by the spirit of international cooperation as interpreted by the Western Democracies. The
Soviet international lawyers do not consider the factor of
reciprocity and mutual give and take as a sine qua nopi of
fundamental importance in the relations of the USSR with
the bourgeois states. This position is.best illustrated by the
Soviet interpretation of the international law axiom "pacta
sunt sevanda."
temporary international law) of "anti-democratic trends, survivals and forms, beginning with the imperialistic and ending
with the feudal" in the in-between period before the world conflagration, is mentioned by E. A. Korovin who wrote that the forward-looking elements of humanity of our day should work in
the direction of their abolition. See Eugene A. Korovin, The
Second World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L. L.
742 at 743 (1946). As to the "class character" of internatoinal
law see S. B. Krylov's op. cit., supra, 418, 419, socio-historical
analysis of the coming of age of the middle class concepts of law.
Krylov wrote that the American and French Revolutions mark the
culmination of the Bourgeois Revolution and pointed out that
"apr~s la victoire de ]a bourgeoisie nous voyons apparaitre le droit
international bourgeois." Ibid., 419.
12. Krylov, op. cit., supra, 415, suggests in relation to the law of nations that "on pourrait nommer le droit international droit interdtatique-et le terme serait plus exact."
13. See elaboration on this point by E. A. Korovin in M. Chakste,
loc. cit., 30. See also T. A. TARACOUZIo, THE SOVIET UNION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1935), The McMillan Co., New York,

"International

Law of the Transition Period." See further R.

SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 279 (1946),

Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

Kegan Paul,
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According to Soviet theory and practice, the concept that
contracts (treaties) must be kept can be given only one interpretation. This interpretation is determined by changing
Russian convenience. While, on the one hand, international'
treaties, to which the USSR is a party, are considered by
it as imposing strict obligations on bourgeois states, the
Soviet Union, on the other, holds itself free of such obligations whenever it finds them subsequently disadvantageous
in the light of political expediency. 4
A favorite yardstick in this connection is, quite often, the
Soviet concept of Sovereignty 5 which, according to Pro14. It is interesting to note that Soviet theorists 'envisage the semblance of an international legal order for this period of "transition.." They discuss the need for certainty and stability so far
as international agreements are concerned. It must be borne in
mind, however, that they think in terms of an underlying assumption. Soviet international lawyers do not consider the factor
of reciprocity and mutual give and take as being necessarily an
element in their interpretation of international relations with
the bourgeois states. As has been already said, the axiom "pacta
sunt servanda" can only be interpreted, in the light of Soviet
practice, as imposing strict observance of international obligations on bourgeois states, while the USSR must feel free to reexamine and weigh its contractual obligations on the scale of
subsequent political expediency. E. A. Korovin held the view
that agreements are "entirely determined by political requirements of a given moment"; see M. Chakste, loc. cit., 27-28, as to
Korovin's ideas on this point. An incident which throws some
lignt on the Russian approach occurred during the sessions of
the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945,
when the U. S. representative, Justice R. H. Jackson, suggested
the consideration of the definition of "aggression" as used in a
non-aggression pact to which the Soviet Union already was a
party. In the course of the discussion, the representative of the
USSR, Gen. I. Nikitchenko, observed that: "Sometimes treaties
change. When one was signed it had one significance and may in
the course of time change that significance and acquire a new
significance. For that reason I thought it best not to refer to
old history . . . "; see ICMT, 302, 317. See also Jackson discusses

Nuremberg Trials, New York Times, Aug. 26, 1948, 4, col. 4, as
to the rather uncomfortable implications Justice Jackson's sug-

gestion carried with it for the Russians. Justice Jackson observed
that "the idea was coldly received. Perhaps the reference to the
Soviet nonaggression treaties was not exactly tactful."
15. An analysis of Soviet theory on this subject is given by Mintauts
Chakste (formerly Justice of the Supreme Court of Latvia),
Soviet Concepts of State, International Law and Sovereignty,

1951]

SOVIET LEGAL CONCEPTS

fessor Eugene A. Korovin 0 is "a weapon in the struggle of
the progressive-democratic forces against the reactionaryimperialist ones." As can be seen from Korovin's definition,
special emphasis is laid on the militant element of the Soviet
approach in the field of international relations with the noncommunist states. This combative spirit seems to weave
like an all-over "Leitmotiv" through Soviet international
law theory. It should be added here that the Soviet concept
of Sovereignty has also its defensive aspect." Russian insistence on the untouchability of Soviet Sovereignty has often
been voiced at Lake Succes. Soviet UN delegates have repeatedly brought up the question of "sovereign rights" of
the USSR and discussed earnestly the sacrosanctity of her
"domestic jurisdiction." Although the Russian arguments
appear to have been taken from the arsenal of Grotian international law and were, therefore, conservative," in their
contemporary Soviet interpretation they have been fashin 43 AM. J.

INT'L. L. 21, at 30 ff. (1949). See also S. B. Krylov,
op. cit., supra,at 450, and at 456; La constitution sovietque de 1936
et la question de la souverainet6. L'URSS sujet de droit international. See also T. A. Taracouzio, op. cit., supra, Ch. III, on Sovereignty, 26 ff. See further R. SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY, 288.
16. This particular aspect of the concept of Soviet sovereignty was
developed by E. A. Korovin during a lecture before the Social
Science Academy of the Russian Communist Party in 1947 according to M. Chavkste, loc. cit., 31. In a paper entitled The Second World War and International Law, in 40 AM. J. INT'L. L.
742, 747, 748 (1946), Col. E. A. Korovin develops the national
(internal) aspect of Soviet sovereignty. The Russian lecturer
on International Law enlarges on the subject of the alleged
democratic benefits for a popular republic in the pursuance of
the socialist policy of sovereignty.
17. M. Chakste, loc. cit., 34, has attempted to sum up the Soviet
concept of Sovereignty in the following phrase: "In its legal
aspect it establishes the right of the Soviet state to independence,
including the right to reject outside interference." Chakste adds,
however, that this standpoint is not upheld by the USSR in its
relations with the Western Democracies. The Soviet state does
not recognize the element of mutuality in its foreign relations with
bourgeois states "as it does not grant these states the protection
of sovereignty." See also ibid., 34, the question of Sovereignty
as an instrument of USSR foreign policy in its relations with the
Slavic countries of Europe.
18. In a discussion during one of the sessions of the 6th Committee
(Legal) of UN General Assembly, 4th Session, 1949, the question
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ioned into dialectical roadblocks to obstruct outside "bourgeois" interference in matters in which the Soviet Union
reserves herself the absolute right of sovereign decision.
III. PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS AND
SOVIET LEGAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINE
Such being-as developed in the preceding pages-the
pointedly "anti-bourgeois" concepts of international law
entertained by the USSR, the original Russian attitude of
reserve, wariness and distrust" towards the Western Democof domestic jurisdiction was defended by the USSR representative Vladimir M. Koretsky. The Russian member of the Committee said that if he could be called "conservative" it was only
in the sense that he wished to "protect and conserve the sovereignty of peoples and states . . . " See UN General Assembly,

4th Session, 6th Committee, Provisional Record of the 200th
Meeting, Nov. 22, 1949; A/C. 6/SR 200, 9, 10, 11. For a brief
note on this see New York Times, Nov. 23, 1949, 5, col. 1.
19. The attitude of the government of the USSR was considerably
influenced by the traditional Russian mistrust towards the West.
See generally The United States and the Soviet Union; Some
Quaker Proposals for Peace, 13, § B (1949), Yale University
Press, New Haven. A report prepared for the American Friends
Service Committee. The leaders of the Soviet Union were under
the apprehension that the victorious Western Powers might,
perhaps, be inclined to show a certain degree of leniency
towards the administration of a state-Germany-which had
retained many vestiges of the bourgeois society set-up, although
it had functioned along totalitarian lines; (see also Charles
Prince, Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International
Organizationof Security, Economic Cooperation and International
Law; a Summary," 39 AM. J. INT'L. L. 450, 469 (1945), as to
the question of this suspected leniency). The Russians feared
that this indisputable structural kinship between German society and that of the rest of Western Europe and North America
might, eventually soften public opinion. Soviet jurists, like A. N.
Trainin, were apprehensive of the possibility of a repetition of the
mistake of the so-called "Leipzig Trials" (1921) where German
war criminals of World War I were tried by lenient German
courts; (see A. N. TRAININ, HITLERITE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
CRIMINAL LAW, Ch. II, 17 (19?), Translation by A. Rothstein,
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London, for a critique of the handling
of war criminals after World War I). Russian lawyers had
also little faith in Western judicial methods (especially AngloAmerican methods) which were considered to provide too
much latitude to the accused; (See Gen. Nikitchenko's relative
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racies in relation to the sincerity of the latter to take decisive steps-in spite of the relative pronouncements 2°-for
the exemplary punishment of the Nazis, can be realized and
understood. The Soviet Union had also declared its decision to call the perpetrators of Nazi atrocities to account"
points in ICMT, 105). It should also be noted that the USSR
representatives at the San Francisco Conference had expressed
reservations concerning an American draft proposal for the
establishment of an international military tribunal; Sidney S.
Alderman, Background and Highlights of the Nuremberg Trial,
XIV I.C.C. PRACTIONER'S JOURNAL 99, at 103 (Nov. 1946)). Under
these circumstances it can be realized why the government of the
Soviet Union did not think it advisable to participate in the
United Nations War Crimes Commission which was established
in London, in October 1942; (see SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR 82, N. 15 (1946), A. A. Knopf,
New York. See also JOHN P. KENNY, MORAL ASPECTS OF NUREMBERG 17 ff. (1949), Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Domican House
of Studies, Washington, D. C., for an analysis of its tasks).
It should be noted that the government of the USSR showed
interest in and was kept informed of the proceedings of this
commission and of the negotiations which Justice Jackson conducted with British and French representatives in relation to
the American proposal of creating an international court for the
trial of the German war criminals of World War II. In his report to the President (June 6, 1945), Justice Jackson observed
that "the government of the USSR, while not yet committed, has
been kept informed of our steps and there is no reason to doubt
that it will unite in the prosecution." ICMT, 42, at 46.
20. For a brief analysis of Allied official pronouncements made during World War II, see Sheldon Glueck, op. cit., supra, Appendix
B, 109 ff.
21. An Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
(Nov. 2, 1942) established an "Extraordinary State Commission
for the determination and investigation of the crimes of the
German Fascist invaders and their accomplices . . . etc." The
Edict further stated that "the criminal German government, the
High Command of the Gernan Army and their accomplices bear
the full measure of criminal and material responsibility." See
A. N. Training, op. cit., supra, 8, 9. The Soviet position in the matter of German war criminality had been made known to "all governments with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations"
in a series of Notes signed by V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. These notes were issued on
November 25, 1941, January 6, 1942, and April 27, 1942 respectively; (see ICMT, 16, and A. N. Trainin, op. cit., supra, 7, 8; see
also The Soviet government's communication (October 14, 1942) to
M. Z. Fierlinger, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
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and was resolved to carry it out even if this had to be done
on a national and not an international scale, although the
latter course seemed to be officially desired. 2
Fortunately, a spirit of international cooperation prevailed and the leaders of the USSR finally accepted the
earnest invitation of the Western Powers to participate in
the International Conference on Military Trials which was
held in London in the summer of 1945.23 This spirit of intiary of Czechoslovakia in ICMT, 13, at 16, in which mention was
made "that those guilty of . . . crimes . .. shall be handed over
to judicial courts and prosecuted and that the sentence passed on
them shall be put into execution." In the MEMORANDUM TO PREsIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND WAR AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, JANUARY 22, 1945 contained in ICMT, 3,

at 8 (Sec. VIII, "Soviet Attitude"), a tone of optimism as to Russian cooperation is expressed. It was stressed that the "Soviet
Union is ready to support all practical measures on the part of the
Allied and friendly governments in bringing the Hitlerites and
their accomplices to justice, and favors their trial before the
'courts of the special international tribunal' and their punishment
in accordance with applicable criminal law."
22. Indicative of this is the following. A. N. Trainin, op. cit., supra, 8,
made, special reference to an official satement of the government
of the USSR (October 14, 1942) which declared that the Russian
administration considered necessary "the committal for trial without delay before a special international tribunal, and the punishment with all the severity of criminal law . . . of the leaders
of Fascist Germany . . . " The same Soviet jurist is also quoted

to have observed that "the fundamental principles of the responsibility of the Hitlerites for crimes connected with the war
have been laid down by the leaders of the democratic nations.
These principles are most fully developed in the Soviet Government's statement of October 14, 1942." See N. Elizov, Soviet
Jurists study Question of Prosecution of Hitlerites for War
Crimes, INFORMATION BULLETIN, N. 145 at 5. (Embassy of the

USSR, Washington, D. C., Dec. 5, 1942.)
23. Sidney S. Alderman, loc. cit., 106, assistant to Justice Jackson,
made a reference to a Russian "promise" to send representatives
to the International Conference on Military Trials in London,
June 26, 1945 to August 8, 1945.
The reserved attitude of the Russians, which is generally elaborated in note 19, found also expression at the Conference. Justice Jackson remarked in his address at the Bar Dinner of the
New York County Lawyers' Association, Hotel Waldorf Astoria,
New York City, December 8, 1948 (see Excerpts from the address: HLS Lib. 76g/6398.7, 4-5), that "the Soviet Delegation,
while friendly and hospitable, was not trusting or intimate. There
could be no doubt that they suspected all the other Delegations
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ternational cooperation may, in part, be attributed to the
fellowship in arms during World War II, and, also, to the
Russian realization that the major powers of the West really meant punitive business. The Conference could be pointed
out as one of the few examples of fruitful cooperation
among the World Powers since the victorious termination
of the war against the European Axis.24
In the immediate period preceding the convocation of
the Conference, the ideological cleavage, which later became
the determining factor in the deterioration of international
relations between the Democracies of the West and the
Eastern Popular Democracies, with the Soviet Union as
their spokesman, was only a slowly spreading crack of not
too serious dimensions. This "weltanschauliche" crack could,
at that time, be cemented through the mutual use of give
and take. The desire for a final reckoning with the leaders
of the Axis was felt to be, by reason of identity of purpose,
the unifying medium for the realization of the earlier
Western and Russian pronouncements.
A clash of conflicting legal philosophies could have been
reasonably expected at the Conference. Representatives of
bourgeois states and proletarian states-to use these dialectical terms-were to embark on a joint venture for the
accomplishment of identical aims but through the application of differing legal approaches, based on conflicting legaltechnical and political backgrounds. Nevertheless, in spite
of such a dubious outlook, which was indicative of envisaged trouble on conceptual issues, Soviet ideas of criminal
law theory"5 and concepts of Soviet criminal procedure" 6of some hidden hostility . . . They always appeared as men

handicapped by orders, minute orders which allowed no discretion, orders which left no room for hesitation or discussion."
24. See Justice Jackson's address (Dec. 8, 1948), loc. cit., 1, note 23.
25. Although the Soviet Delegation did not press for an application
of the whole Russian criminal law system (see, for example,
Gen. Nikitchenko's relative remark, ICMT, 79), the overtone of
the arguments of the Soviet representatives had an inevitable
general consonance with the legal-technical pattern of Soviet
criminal law theory in its current and apparently definitely
crystallized phase, as it has developed since 1936. In 1936, Soviet
legal theory made its "conditional" peace, or rather, established
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a workable "modus vivendi" with conventional and authoritative
legal principles of basically Western origin. A quest for organic
stability of juridical concepts was then initiated. This quest was
conditioned by a desire to reconcile, to bring into logical agreement, the consolidated achievements of the Soviet Revolution with
a permanent institutional structure of legal norms. In this period
of renascent "legal" doctrine-which had been expected to "wither away" under the social impact of the Revolution-more emphasis was put, again, on orthodox juridical approaches with the earlier
and, then, dominant "sociological" concepts playing, now, the
role of a generalized, directive "Leitmotif." It should be noted here
that the reconciliatory readjustments found their special constructive expression in Soviet Criminal Law theory. Stalin stated
that stability was essentially necessary in criminal law given
that socialism had been achieved in 1936 (see Harold J. Berman,
Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 YALE L. J. 803, text and
note 3 (1947); Ibid., 805, text and note 14). Generally, one
could say, that the whole context of the new harmonization in the
field of criminal law could be visualized through the Soviet concept
of the science of criminal law which should "develop juridical doctrines of the various institutes of criminal law in connection with
their social-economic content and their historical conditioning"; see
Harold J. Berman, loc. cit., 806, text and note 20. With legislation
as the sole source of Soviet criminal law (see Harold J. Berman,
loc. cit., 806 ff.), the sociological "Leitmotif"-which is of particular value to the Soviet state-weaves consistently through
contemporary Russian criminal law theory. "Soviet law defines
crimes as an act of commission (or omission) dangerous to the
community, transgressing the foundations of the Soviet system
or Socialist law and order (material feature) and entailing
punishment (formal feature)" wrote Professor Trainin in an
article, Fundamental Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 95
LAW JOURNAL 259 (1945). The Soviet jurist observed (loc. cit.,
259) that the fundamental characteristic of Russian criminal
law is the "principle of material appraisal" of crime. This principle of Soviet law and order underscores the emphasis which is
laid on protecting all material expressions of life in the socialist
community. Therefore, an act, in order to be criminal in the
USSR, must be dangerous in the sense of jeopardizing the material values of the community.
A very interesting feature of Soviet criminal law theory is the
so-called "subjective" standard of guilt. The Soviet approach is
that the criminal court must not look only at a particular act
but also at the accused "as a whole man," with special psychological characteristics in each case. The role of the actor (the
criminal) is examined from the "subjective" point of view, that
is, his state of mind, his initiative and his realization of personal responsibility and imputability are taken into careful consideration; (see Harold J. Berman, loc. cit., 818). "Soviet law,"
wrote Professor Trainin, "states perfectly definitely that without
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which had followed a course of development that was
strongly conditioned and flavored by Russian political history since 1917-did not prove as unelastic as had been expected. Coordination of legal standpoints, although laboriously achieved, was brought about in several complicated
issues.
The following pages represent the major complications
in the field of the East-West controversies on juridical technicalities at the Conference.
IV. CONFLICTING SOVIET AND WESTERN
VIEWS ON THE FORM OF THE
INDICTMENT
One of the questions which caused considerable discussionm2 around the large square table"8 of the Conference was
the matter of the "form" of the indictment. During the
first session of the Conference," General I. T. Nikitchenko,
guilt criminal responsibility cannot be incurred"; (loe. cit., 259;

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

see also Harold J. Berman, loc. cit., 818). Consequently, "objective imputability" is not considered acceptable in Soviet theory
for if the accused has acted under the compulsion of a pathological condition he would be held non-imputable for results he did
not intend.
See note 41.
Cf. John N. Hazard, The Soviet Union and InternationalLaw 43
ILL. L. REV. 591, at 603 (1948).
See ICMT (Forewood) XIII about technical arrangements and
about the informality which prevailed at the Conference.
June 26, 1945 in London. See Minutes of this first session of the
Conference in ICMT, 71 ff.
General I. T. Nikitchenko was the vice-president of the Soviet
Supreme Court and presiding officer of its criminal division;
ICMT (Preface) XII. The other USSR delegate to the Conference was Professor A. N. Trainin, author and teacher in the
fields of Soviet and international law; Ibid. (Preface) XII. Both
were, according to Justice R. H. Jackson, "authoritative exponents of Soviet legal practice and philosophy"; Ibid. (Preface)
XII. See Excerpts from an address by Justice R. H. Jackson, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, at the Bar
Dinner of the New York County Lawyers' Association, December 8, 1949 (HLS Lib. 76g/6398.7) for a general appraisal of
contacts with these two Soviet jurists by the U. S. representative.
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representative of the Soviet Union," requested a detailed
explanation of criminal prosecution as practiced in the
United States. Nikitchenko probably envisaged inevitable
complications due to fundamental divergencies of viewpoints between his delegation and those of the Western
Democracies as to the exact steps to be taken in the projected prosecution of the war criminals of the European
Axis. In the light of this probable eventuality, the Russian
general wanted to inform himself about "the actual raising
or preparing of a charge as applied to the tasks which lie
' 31
before the International Tribunal.
31.

ICMT, 76. It should be noted here that Nikitchenko's request
channelled the discussion towards the realization of a basic dialectical requirement: the, thorough, all-around understanding of
concepts, procedures and technicalities by all who took part in
the deliberations of the Conference. Such an approach seemed
quite appropriate for the underlying difficulty appeared to be,
quite often, the degree argumentative differences were a matter
of words or of substance. But it was not only the Russians who
favored such a course. The Anglo-American idea of a constructive exchange, comparison, coordination and eventual reconciliation of points of view was underlined by Jackson who remarked
relatively, "I think both will have to develop our ideas as we go
along." ICMT, 77. In 1948, during an address at the Bar Dinner
of the New York County Lawyers' Association, Jackson elaborated on the Russian attitude as to technical semantics: "It was
my experience with the Soviet lawyers at Nuremberg that the
most important factor in collaboration with the Soviet was patiently and persistently to make sure, when a proposition is first
advanced, that it is thoroughly understood and that both sides
are using their words to express the same sense. When this was
done, the Soviet lawyers kept their agreements with us quite as
scrupulously as Amercian lawyers would." See Excerpts from
Justice Jackson's address (Dec. 8, 1948), preceding note. It is
noteworthy that the Russian Delegation showed great interest and
asked for details about "cross-examination" from the Western
Delegations as this procedural featufe was unknown in the Soviet
system, ICMT, 403 (Gen. Nikitchenko). Once the Soviet jurists
understood its mechanics, "they loved it," according to Justice
Jackson (The Trial of Trials: Nuremberg, 3 COMMON CAUSE
284, at 289-290 (Jan. 1950)), and used it extensively during the
trials.
See also Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Cross-Examination, Revue
Internationale de Droit Penal (Bulletin de l'Association Internationale de Droit Penal), Vol. 18, 1947, 1 ff., in which the head
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The representative of the United States, Associate Justice R. H. Jackson, thereupon explained 2 that, from the
American point of view, the initial task of the members of
the Conference, as prosecutors, would be to collect the evidentialy material. The second step, as the U. S. Delegation
envisaged it, would be the drawing up of an indictment or
"bill of accusation" 33 which would contain the selected names
of those persons whom the Conference considered guilty
on the basis of the collected evidence. These persons would
be charged with certain crimes in this document. The next
procedural phase would be the presentation of the indictment to the projected court,34 the International Military
Tribunal. Jackson pointed out that, according to the legal
system of the United States, this final action constituted the
first contact between the prosecution and the court. He
added, significantly, that the court
"would then have nothing before it except the indictment
but it would fix the time of trial and might assign counsel. On
the trial date we would produce in court all of our evidence. The
court would not have the evidence merely as a result of its being
gathered by the prosecutors but it would have received it in open
session.""

Justice Jackson did not want to leave any doubt in the
minds of the Russian jurists as to the role of the court in
this opening phase of the projected trials. "The court,"

32.
33.
34.

35.

of the Delegation of the United Kingdom discussed the basic
differences between the British and the French criminal procedures.
In what he called "a crude way"; ICMT, 77; see also 76.
ICMT, 76.
Referring to this phase of the procedure Jackson said: "That
brings the case into court-when you have an indictment."
ICMT, 76.
ICMT, 76, 77. Justice Jackson, discussing the differences between
the procedural technicalities of the legal systems which were
considered at the Conference, remarked during a later session
that "the evidence, in order to be evidence in our [American]
system, would have to be produced before the Tribunal itself or
some master representing the Tribunal. The fact that the prosecutors get and examine the evidence would not be sufficient to
bring it to the attention of the court. Therefore, under our system, unless the evidence were taken before a master representing
the court, it might not be admissible." ICMT, 265-266.
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said the U. S. representative, "would take no responsibility
for the production of any part of the proof. It would have
no part in the prosecution." 36
Judge Robert Falco,3" the representative of France at
the Conference, followed his American colleague in this
line of juridical thought by stating that the French courts
held themselves outside of the prosecution and that they
in no way interfered with the work of the prosecuting officers. 8 The British Delegation voiced also its agreement
36. In the preface to his report on the ICMT (Preface) IV, Justice
Jackson told of a "fundamental cleavage" which persisted
throughout the deliberation of the Conference. The cause of this
could be attributed to the Soviet conception of the Russian Delegation in regard to the role of a court. The SoViet jurists viewed
and understood the function of a court as "one of the organs of
government power, a weapon in the hands of the ruling class
for the purpose of safe-guarding its interests." (See also VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 248, 249, 252, 255 (1948), University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, as to USSR
courts as agencies of the administration.) According to the Soviet
concept, a court is a "dependent" agency not responsible only
before the law but also before the government. Such a Soviet
concept was foreign to jurists of the Western Democracies. Besides, the inquisitorial features of the Soviet criminal trial
seemed to me in pronounced contrast with Anglo-American legal
theory in particular. In a recent address (Sept. 1, 1949) before
the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association, Justice Jackson reiterated the standpoint which he had
developed at the Conference in 1945; that the court was not to
be burdened with the responsibility for the preparation and the
actual conduct of the prosecution; that it should only receive
the indictment, hear the collected evidence and render judgment
after that. On the other hand, Justice Jackson told his audience
at Banff, Alberta, "The Soviet idea was that the case would
actively be conducted by the Tribunal, with the prosecutors as
subordinates. The Tribunal, they thought, should decide what
witnesses to call, what documents to put in evidence, and should
examine the witnesses and interrogate the accused," See Nuremberg in Retrospect, XXVII CAN. B. REV. 761, at 768 (1949).
37. Judge R. Falco was a member of the "Cour de Cassation," the
highest court of France; ICMT (Preface) XI.
38. Judge Falco remarked relatively that the procedural situation in
France was characteristic of the "great similarity with the
American system as it has been exposed by Mr. Justice Jackson."
(One feels constrained, however, to limit the features of general
similarity to the point developed in the text [above]. It must be
borne in mind that American precedure is accusatorial whereas
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with the procedural concepts which had been thus far outlined and considered suggestible,39 and it appeared from
the general context of the views expressed, that there existed a considerable degree of similarity of outlooks among
the representatives of the Western Democracies. On the
other hand, some difficulty was expected from the Russian
side.
Professor A. N. Trainin" of the USSR Delegation made
an elaborate statement as to the projected function of the
prosecution at the trial of the war criminals. His support of
the idea for an independent "preparatory or auxiliary body"
to undertake this task was illustrated by his drawing the attention of the Conference to the fact that the Soviet system
of criminal law foresaw a prosecuting body acting on its own
authority.4 The Russian representative pointed out that the
its French counterpart is inquisitorial.) The French representative told the Conference that as its members were working "on
a new thing in this International Tribunal," he had no desire to
insist upon an adoption of the procedural system of his country.
Nevertheless, he thought it advisable to explain it "to see whether
there are better ideas to be used" by the Conference. Accordingly he went into some detail about the function of the magistratorial prosecution in France which is conducted by the "juge
d'instruction"; see ICMT, 78. See also David Maxwell Fyfe,
Cross Examination in 18 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL
1; as to particulars about what is, in fact, an inquisitorial
procedure before the French "juge d'instruction" in comparison with accusatorial procedural aspects of the prosecution in
the United Kingdom. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe was the British
representative at the ICMT for all but the closing session. With
the change in the British government, after the victory of the
Labour Party at the polls, he was replaced by Lord Jowitt, Lord
Chancellor; ICMT, 441.
39. ICMT, 79. It is noteworthy that Justice Jackson, addressed himself to the British Delegation during the discussion about the
nature of the indictment in its American form. "I assume," said
Justice Jackson, that "your form of indictment, which we have
largely copied, is very similar." G. D. Roberts, K. C., of the British
Delegation answered that it was "much the same. In the charges
the accused is given sufficient particulars for him to know with
what he is charged so that he can prepare his defense." Ibid., 79.
40. ICMT, 78. Professor Trainin, Member, Soviet Academy of Sciences; Ibid., 441.
41. Professor Trainin did not want the Conference to be under the
impression that prosecution and court activities overlapped. He
explained that Soviet law provided for separate and independent
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prosecution in criminal trials; ICMT, 78. The importance and the
function of the Soviet procurator has been stressed by Anna L.
Strong, "The New Soviet Constitution," H. Holt and Co., New
York, 1937, 82, who wrote that his was "the most independent
office in the USSR." See also Harold J. Laski, Law and Justice
in Soviet Russia, London, Hogarth Press, 1935, 23, as to the
office of the Soviet Procurator. As to the constitutional range
of his functions and those of the organs of his office, see articles
113 to 117 the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR
(1936) ; English translation; Nat. Council of American-Soviet
Friendship, New York, 1947, 38, 39. Generally speaking, the duty
of the Soviet procurator is to maintain the socialist system of
law, to see to it that offenders are punished and to exercise his
authority for the protection of the rights and interests of the
Soviet citizens; (see as to this: (a) The Russian Judicial System, communication of the USSR Consulate at Pretoria, Union
of South Africa, in LXII So. AFR. L. J. 344, at 345 (1945), and
(b) John M. Hazard, Soviet Criminal Procedure, 15 TULANE L.
REV. 220, at 222 (1941). According to Soviet Criminal Procedure,
a procurator or a "preliminary" investigator, whose activities
are controlled by the procurator, may initiate the pre-trial
procedure of an investigation. (John N. Hazard, loc. cit., 223.)
This investigation must be conducted in the spirit of impartiality (Soviet Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 111) and as quest for
"material truth," that is, the accurate establishment of facts.
(See Materials, Comparison of Soviet and American Law, HLS,
1949-50-translated excerpts from "Foundations of Soviet State
and Law," Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, Ministry of Justice, 1947, 67.) Every possible phase of
a case under investigation must be examined "whether it points
towards guilt or innocence" (John N. Hazard, loc. cit., 225). The
editor of the So. AFR. L. J. (loc. cit., 346) commented on this
feature of Soviet criminal procedure by observing that "while
the principle of strict impartiality free from local prejudice and
influences is a very excellent one, it smacks somewhat of perfectionism." The "preliminary"- investigator is responsibile for
the gathering of the evidence and his report, along with the
indictment which he draws up (containing the principal particulars of the evidence and the articles of the Soviet Crim.
Code under which the accused is considered to be guilty), is
sent to the procurator for review. The procurator, who has the
final word, decides whether the collected evidence is sufficient to
justify prosecution in which case he sanctions the indictment.
The Code of Soviet Crim. Proc. (Art. 207) provides that the
indictment must be drawn up in a certain specified manner.
John N. Hazard (Drafting the Nuremberg Indictmcnt, VIII
AMERICAN REVIEW ON THE SOVIET UNION 16, at 19 (March 1947)),
wrote relatively that it must contain "a brief statement of the
substance of the case with the circumstances in support of, as
well as against, holding the defendant responsible . . . " It

is
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"prosecuting body" or "prosecutor ' 12 of the American procedural concept corresponded to a "commission of inquiry"
in the Soviet system. The Soviet Delegation accepted, in
principle, the creation of such a body. Differences of opinion, however, arose out of the envisaged scope and function of this prosecuting organ. The Russians understood
that this organ, proposed by the U. S. Delegation, would
be entrusted with the bringing together of all the evidentiary
material and would then "sum it up into a form of indictment." Professor Trainin explained relatively that such a
summation was inadequate and inconclusive from the Soviet
point of view. The Soviet jurist observed that if such an indictment was "merely a form of statement of the case
against the criminal, it would not be sufficient."
As can be seen from the context of the minutes of the
Conference session during which the form of the indictment was first- discussed'4, Professor Trainin wanted to put
emphasis on one particular argument. According to the
standpoint of the Soviet Delegation, the "preparatory or
auxiliary body"-the prosecution, in fact-should bring before the projected court a complete, all encompassing evidentiary instrument of accusation. The Russian jurist insisted that "the evidence would have to be handed in with
''
the indictment. 14

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

interesting to note that the indictment must also contain the
evidence in the form of detailed information along with a list
of witnesses and a list of exhibits (material evidence). See also
Judah Zelitch, op. cit., 150, 151. It was on account of this procedural technicality that the Soviet position in favor of the inclusion of a "full statement" of the evidence against the Nazi
war criminals did not meet favorable consideration by the jurists
of the Western Democracies at the Conference.
See relative observations made by Justice Jackson and Professor Trainin; ICMT, 76, 77, 78.
ICMT, 78 (Professor Trainin).
Ibid., 78 (Professor Trainin).
Session of June 26, 1945; ICMT, 71 ff.
ICMT, 78 (Professor Trainin). Gen. Nikitchenko also went into
some detail on this question (ICMT, 80): "In the view of the
Soviet Union," he said, "if the court is to be assisted that (that
is, the evidentiary) material should be referred to it and reference should be made in the indictment as to the reasons for the
charges advanced, giving the evidence that has been collected
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Generally speaking, given the fact that there existed no
difference of opinion as to the principle that there should
be a.prosecuting organ,47 the controversy seemed to center
around the question whether the evidentiary material was
to be submitted to the court or whether it was to be kept
by the prosecuting officers.4" Justice Jackson, in order to
clear up what he called a "misunderstanding," affecting the
whole matter under discussion, told the Russian. Delegation
that: "Our 4" indictment is merely a charge. It merely accuses
and names the crime of which it accuses, tells briefly where
and leaving it with the court as completely presented." Ibid., 80.
Another important statement as to Soviet practice which the
Russian general made is the following: "in the Soviet system
the indictment itself is not regarded as evidence. It is merely
the document containing particulars of the offense and the evidence on which it is chargeable." Ibid., 80. Finally, the Soviet
representative summarized the basic contention of his Delegation
in this phrase "the Soviet Delegation takes the view that the
indictment should be accompanied by the evidence, the evidentiary material." Ibid., 81. Gen. Nikitchenko pressed this point
because he claimed that all the necessary evidence was available
and lengthy preliminary investigations were considered as unnecsary by the Soviet jurists. Ibid., 81, 82. Gen. Nikitchenko went also
into some detail at a later session (July 17, 1945; ICMT, 262 ff.) on
the subject of the prosecution and the indictment. He explained
that, according to the view of the Soviet Delegation, "the prosecution interrogates the accused and the witnesses and collects all the
documents which testify that such acts have been committed.
When the prosecution has carefully examined and checked those
documents and when the prosecution considers that the whole of
evidence and of the documents is of sufficient importance to prepare an indictment, that indictment is made and presented" to
the court. He also pointed out that the "accused are informed
of all documents" (ICMT, 268) (a procedural technicality which
met with objections on the part of the Western jurists at the
Conference; see John N. Hazard, Drafting the Nuremberg Indictment, VIII AMERICAN REVIEW ON THE SOVIET UNION 16, 19
(March 1947). Gen Nikitchenko stated that "after the indictment has been properly prepared and confirmed . . . that indict-

ment is passed on to the tribunal together with all the material
confirming it, the material on which it is based-that is to say,
all the documents referring to the case, all the protocols, all examination of witnesses referring to the indictment." ICMT, 268.
47. See Professor Trainin's observation'as to this; ICMT, 78.
48. ICMT, 80 (Gen. Nikitchenko).
49. (American.)
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it was committed and when, and does not give evidence." 5
The U.S. representative, however, stressed the point that
he had never intended to press for a trial according to an
unmodified American system of procedure." Judge Falco

of the French Delegation expressed himself also in conciliatory and cooperative terms. 5 2 The Soviet Delegation, in
order to show the Russian desire for a workable compromise

with the juridical representatives of the Western Democracies, told the Conference-in the same spirit of mutual
understanding-that they did not intend to suggest the application of the whole Soviet system-": to the trial of the war
criminals. What the Soviet Delegation wanted was a simplification of the procedure so as to facilitate the work of the
projected court.
After these statements and some discussion, it became
apparent that a general understanding on procedural tech-

nicalities could be invisaged hopefully by the Conference,
ICMT, 78, 79.
ICMT, 80; Justice Jackson, summing up the general attitude of
the American Delegation in this matter, stated relatively: "What
we are trying to do is to depart from ours [meaning the "American system"] and find a system which, while it follows the general philosophy of our system, is one on which we can hope to
try these cases in a reasonable length of time and without undue
difficulties." Ibid., 80.
52. Judge Falco followed a practical and realistic line of thought
in his arguments which was indicative of the constructive intention of the French Delegation to contribute its part in overcoming the complications which had arisen; "I suggest," said
Judge Falco, "that we iron out the difficulties of criminal law
and see what we want, extracting from our different laws the
best factors. Also, we agree that we would like to put before the
court a complete investigation, and we do not want to waste time
because it would take much time and create a bad impression
on the Allied and German people. I submit that the first question
is to make a complete investigation. I believe the Soviet views,
which are very near the French one-it would be the act of
transmitting to the court the charges and the evidence going
with it, and it should be for examination by the prosecuting
officer. Whatever the forms we will adopt of that, certainly the
French Delegation has no preference. We should go to work
with the idea that a system of international prosecution must be
reached, and we must not risk the court's not being satisfied.
That is the most important question." ICMT, 80, 81.
53. ICMT, 79 (Gen. Nikitchenko).

50.
51.
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especially since Gen. Nikitchenko had remarked that "views
expressed seem to be approaching one another" and that the
Conference could proceed with its work. 4 Under these
favorable circumstances Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan"5
considered it advisable to clear up any underlying misunderstandings and dispel any possible doubts of the Soviet Delegation that the modified American procedure might cause a
delay5" between the lodging of the indictment and the actual
54. ICMT, 81. Gen. Nikitchenko, who must have been rather reasonably satisfied with the course the discussion had taken, probably made this remark in general connection with a suggestion
that the procedural scheme advanced by Justice Jackson should
be modified in such a manner so as to allow the court to receive
not only the indictment but also evidentiary material in support
of it; see Judge Falco's and Gen. Donovan's relative elaborations; ICMT, 80, 81.
It should also be noted here that after Gen. Donovan had
brought forward some supplementary explanations as to the
general aspects envisaged by the American Delegation, Gen.
Nikitchenko agreed that details concerning the indictment could
be worked out later. Ibid., 82.
55. ICMT, 82; Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director, Office of
Strategic Services, was one of the assistants of Justice Jackson
at the Conference. Ibid., 441.
56. The question of the time element had been stressed by Gen.
Nikitchenko in the sense that the Soviet Delegation wanted the
adoption of a procedure which would ensure procedural speed.
In connection with this matter, Gen. Nikitchenko had been
somehow critical of the legal systems of the English-speaking
countries and had advocated that the Conference "should not
select any individual national system of trial." The Soviet representative had also observed that, as the Conference would have
"to deal with something completely new, it would be necessary
for the representatives to select the best of the different systems with a view to achieving speed in arriving at a decision";
see ICMT, 105. Justice Jackson commented on these issues by
reviewing the various causes which contributed to the complication of the process of reaching an agreement on legal-technical
differences and, also, by putting special emphasis on certain determinative factors; " . . . in the matter of procedure we are quite

wide apart because of the fact that our legal traditions are so
far apart. We will reconcile these defferences only with difficulty.
While they appear to be merely matters of procedure, they are
matters of procedure so deeply ingrained in the thought of the
American people that some of the theories of procedure mentioned here could not be supported by us. Whether right or not,
I do not attempt to say. Different systems have their own merits.
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presentation of the evidence in court. Any kind of delay
which might have created an entirely undesired prolongation of the trials of the war criminals was not envisaged
by the Western Powers who wanted a speedy judicial
reckoning."
It should be noted here that the representatives of the
Western Democracies stood generally firm on the question
of procedure although some concessions were made. But
they would not accept the Russian proposal that the indictment should furnish the court and the Nazi defendants with
what Justice Jackson has termed a "dossier" of the evidence,
including all the documentary material relied upon, along
with the statements of witnesses." So it came about that
Systems which work with one temperament will not with another, and no one has been more severely critical than I of the
American system of criminal justice, which, as suggested by the
Soviet delegates, leads to great delay and sometimes miscarriage
by delay. Nevertheless, each of us has the problem of making
the results here acceptable in the sight of his people, and we
shall have to consider procedure in that light." ICMT, 113. Justice Jackson advanced again, at a later session, the argument
of the needed moral sanction of his decisions at the Conference
by the people of the United States. He did this in relation to
his point that, although he agreed that the indictment should be
accompanied by as much as possible evidentiary material, it would
be absolutely essential to call witnesses "in open court"; the
American representative pointed out relatively that "our people
in the United States would not understand anything less than
that as a trial." ICMT, 267.
57. The possibility that the implications of delay or prolongation
of the planned trial might have had a disadvantageous effect on
the degree of support of the whole venture by public opinion in
the United States had not been overlooked by the American
Delegation. John N. Hazard, adviser on Soviet Law to Justice
Jackson, elaborates on this in his article: Drafting the Nurcinberg Indictment, VIII AMERICAN REVIEW ON THE SOVIET UNION
16, 20 (March 1947). The question of the non-prolongation of

the trial was also a characteristic feature of the Military Court
which handled the case of the Japanese General Yamashita. See
the highly critical analysis of this in A. FRANK REELs, THE CASE
OF GENERAL YAMASHITA, Ch. 8, 16 (1949), Univ. of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill.

58. R. H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect,
761, 768 (1949). See also, Ibid., 767, 768, a
Soviet criticisms directed against United
and especially the "skeleton statement of

XXVII CAN. B. REV.
brief consideration of
States legal methods
charges" (the indict-
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the Soviet Delegation found itself unsupported in its views.
The Soviet jurists finally yielded and accepted the general
context of Common Law methods, although such a course
was not in accordance-as they stated " -with Soviet procedural legislation. The Russians explained the reason of
their acceptance of legal-technical methods which were
foreign to them by observing that they recognized that the
suggested approach was the "usual procedure" in the United
Kingdom and the United States and was, therefore, more
widely known." By yielding on this point, the Soviet jurists
had made a concession so far as their recognition of the
wide geographical significance of non-socialist legal systems
was concerned.
It must also be borne in mind that the juristic representatives of the Western Democracies had also taken steps in
the general direction of meeting the Soviet Union's Delegation on mutually acceptable grounds. Justice Jackson had
made the helpful suggestion that the projected court should
be created on such a basis so as to ensure the adoption and
inclusion of legal-technical features which the Conference
considered "the best from all systems."'" This attitude
facilitated the consideration and acceptance of procedural
concepts taken from Soviet legal theory. In connection with
this it must be noted that the Russian requirements of defense for the defendants in criminal trials which had been
outlined by Professor Trainin before the Conference"2 found
their general adoption and application in Article i6 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed
to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the
ment). In relation to these criticisms Justice Jackson wrote
significantly, "There is much to be said in support of these

criticisms." Ibid., 768.
59.

ICMT, 269. (Professor Trainin).

60. See R. H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect, XXVII CAN. B.
61.

REv. 761, 768 (1949).
ICMT, 270 (Justice Jackson).

62. ICMT. 110; Professor Trainin: "I have in view the rights of
the defendant to be defended, his right to receive the indictment,
the right of giving all the necessary explanations during the
proceedings, and the right also to receive a copy of the indictment
in his own native language."
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major war criminals of the European Axis which was signed
in London on August 8, 1945." Viewing the results of the
Conference from the vantage point of comparative law, one
cannot fail to notice that legal novelties were achieved by
common agreement. It must be noted relatively that the
general context of the trial procedure which was agreed
upon at the London Conference did not bear the exclusively
national characteristics of any specific country or legal system. The procedural technique which was devised constituted
the highly cerebrated product of international legal craftsmen 64 who had broken new ground in the field of international criminal law and procedure. The procedure embodied, according to Justice Jackson, several compromises
between Anglo-American and "Continental procedure," that
is, those of the French and the Russians. 6 5 The international
jurists, who deliberated in London, found a satisfactory
solution, particularly as to the indictment," by agreeing that
63.

For the text of the Agreement and the annexed Charter in its
English, French and Russian versions of equal authenticity see
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT SERIES, No. 472 (1946), U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
64. See also R. H. Jackson (Foreword) in SHELDON GLUECK, op. cit.
supra Note 19 at X.
65. "Divergent legal philosophies . . . . " wrote Justice Jackson in
his foreword to S. GLUECK'S op. cit. supra Note 19, at XI,
" . . . have been reconciled in a workable procedure which, as I
think has been demonstrated, preserves every element of a fair
hearing."
66. R. H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect, XXVII CAN. B. REV.
761, 768 (1949). See also JOHN P. KENNY, MORAL ASPECTS OF NuREMBERG 25 (1949),
Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Domican
House of Studies, Washington, D. C. Discussing the controversy
around the basic features of the indictment; John N. Hazard,
Drafting the Nuremberg Indictment, VIII AMERICAN REVIEW
ON THE SOVIET UNION 16, 20 (March 1947)) wrote that "the
compromise solution was finally accepted that some particulars
would be stated in support of the charge, but that the prosecution
was to reserve the right to present examples from the particulars
listed as well as others of like sort." See also remark made by
Gen. Nikitchenko as to the suggestibility of allowing the court
to accept additional evidence during the course of the trial;
ICMT, 406. See text of the indictment in 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRESSION,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES

CHIEF OF

COUNSEL

FOR PROSECUTION OF AxIs CRIMINALITY 13 ff. (1946), U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
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it should contain somehow wider evidentiary features" than
would be customary in an American criminal trial, while, at
the same time, it would furnish the Nazi defendants less
information than would be given them in France and in
Russia, whose systems showed certain signs of similarity.
V.

SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED DEFINITION
OF AGGRESSION AND THE RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION
OF THE

Moscow

DECLARATION

Another highly controversial discussion at the Conference
centered around the American proposal of including in the
Charter of the Military Tribunal, which was to be drawn
up by the Conference, a definition of aggression." Justice
Jackson had thought it to the point to remind the Conference that precedents existed in international instruments
on this subject. As it happened, the realistic but somehow
undiplomatic proposal of the American representative to
define aggression on the basis of the pertinent language
wbich had been used in a non-aggression treaty, signed at
London (July 3, 1933) by Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia,
Iran, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the USSR"0 caused
67.

Gen. Nikitchenko expressed the acceptance by the Soviet Delegation of the definitive form and contents of the indictment as
follows: "We understand that we have reached agreement as to
the fact before the trial a certain amount of evidence would be
lodged with the tribunal together with the indictment." ICMT,
413.
68. See relative observations made on the question of resemblance
between the French and Russian systems by Gen. Nikitchenko,
ICMT, 79 and by Judge Falco, Ibid., 81. See further John N.
Hazard, Drafting the Nuremberg Indictment, VIII AMERICAN
REvIEw ON THE SOVIET UNION 16, 17 (March 1947), and Soviet
Criminal Procedure, 15 TULANE L. REV. 220, 223 (1941), by the
same writer. See also Sidney S. Alderman, Background and
High lights of the Nuremberg Trial, XIV I.C.C. PRACTIONERS'
JOURNAL 99, 107 (Nov. 1946), as to the general similarity of
Russian, French and German concepts on the subject of the
contents of an indictment.
69. This was one of the issues on which agreement was not reached,
as Justice Jackson has pointed out in the preface of his report
on the work of the Conference. "This omission may well be regarded as a defect, at least in theory, in the Charter" (of the
International Military Tribunal). See ICMT (Preface) VII.
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some embarrassment and was frigidly received by the Soviet
Delegation.' In this connection it is interesting to note that,
aside from the easily understandable desire of the Soviet
jurists to avoid the discussion of the basic features of a
non-aggression treaty which the Soviet Union had violated
so far as the majority of the signatories was concerned, one
can see the concerted effort of the Soviet Delegation to
dismiss the embarrassing American proposal by suggesting
that a definition of aggression was outside the competence
of the Conference. Gen. Nikitchenko, referring to the court
which would be set up, said that:
"The Tribunal would not be competent to judge really what
kind of war was launched by the defendants; neither would it go
into the question of the causes of war. If we try to enter a definition of aggression in the Charter, that we would not be competent
to do, as the Tribunal would not be competent to do so. It would
really be up to the United Nations or the security organization
...to go into questions of this sort . . . The task of the Tribunal
is to try war criminals who have committed certain criminal
acts. ''72
70. Article II of this treaty defined the "aggressor" in an international conflict. Justice Jackson thought relatively that the definition had been "worked out very carefully"; ICMT, 273. For the
text of this article, see Ibid., 273,4. For the complete text of the
"Convention for the definition of Aggression" signed at London,
July 3, 1933, see 147 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 67 ff.
71. See Gen. Nikitchenko's reactions on 317, ICMT and the writer's
relative comments in note 14. See also Justice Jackson's comments, in retrospect, in the same note. It should be noted here
that the Soviet Union was very sensitive on the subject of the
non-aggression treaty of London (1933). Gen. Nikitchenko told
the Conference that his Delegation "did not find it possible" to
consider a "reference about pacts which condemned aggression";
ICMT, 328. The Soviet representative buttressed his standpoint
by making a reference to the World Organization. "We have
looked through the Charter of the United Nations . . . " said the

Russian jurist and observed that, "while aggression is mentioned
several times, it is not defined anywhere in that instrument." At
this point he brought forward a novel proposition. "Apparently
this is due to the fact that aggression has become a formula in
itself. Apparently when people speak about 'aggression,' they
come up against difficulties, which it has not been possible to
overcome up to the present time." ICMT, 328.
72. ICMT, 303. Aside from the reasons given above, an additional
Russian argument of "political" nature came here into play. The
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Gen. Nikitchenko stated also that no attempt had been
made to define aggression at the time the United Nations
Charter was adopted during the San Francisco Conference
and that, in consideration of the negative position taken
there, he thought that, a fortiori, the Four-Power Conference, or he personally, for that matter, was not competent "to work out a definition. ' 7 3 Although the Soviet Delegation objected to the drawing up of a definition of agression
in general, the Soviet jurists fervently desired to pin the
commission of aggression on Nazi Germany in particular,
thus making the essence of aggression depend on the actions
of one nation which had committed it with the implied
exclusion of all other aggressor nations. The representatives
of the Western Democracies, on the other hand, were inclined to believe that the application of such a narrow formuSoviet position was that the criminality of the Nazi leaders had
already been established. (See page 42 for an elaboration of
this argument.) The USSR Delegation was satisfied that the

leaders of the Nazi Party were considered by them as war criminals who had engineered German aggression. On the basis of
this Russian conclusion, Gen. Nikitchenko expressed the point
of view of his Delegation as to the functions of the court to be
set up by stating that the "task of the Tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each particular person and mete
out the necessary punishment-the sentences." ICMT, 303. The
Russian wish to see aggression branded solely as a Nazi venture
can be detected in the following tersely phrased observation made
by Gen. Nikitchenko. "Is it supposed, then, to condemn aggression
or initiation of war in general or to condemn specifically aggressions started by the Nazis in this war? If the attempt is to have
a general definition, that would not be agreeable." ICMT, 387.
Professor Trainin had expressed earlier a less emphatic view.
"Although, of course, aggression or domination would not be
permissible by any power, this Tribunal (meaning the projected
court) was to be established for the trial of European Axis criminals." ICMT, 334.
73. ICMT, 308. Gen Nikitchenko, however, had a suggestion to make.
He observed that the difficulty which had arisen might be resolved
by a reference "to some more recent declarations" (the Soviet
representative probably wanted thereby to avoid any further
discussion of "definition of aggression" as contained in the illfated non-aggression pact of 1933). He suggested that an appropriate solution might be found by the use of a phrase such as
"the policy of aggression condemned by the United Nations Organization." ICMT, 309.
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lation could not possibly be accepted and that it would not
serve as a directive precedent for the development of international criminal law concepts.
The Russian argument was that the war criminality of
the principal Nazi leaders had been duly recognized and
established by the so-called Moscow Declaration (1943) .
In his explanation of a Soviet memorandum" dealing with
Russian considerations and views, Gen. Nikitchenko observed that the Conference was dealing with the major war
criminals "who have been convicted and whose conviction
has already been announced by both the Moscow and
Crimea Declarations"5 by the heads of the governments."
74. The Declaration o.fGerman

Atrocities (see

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN,

9 IUNITED

STATES

No. 228, 307 at 310, 311 (1943).

for the complete text) which was signed by President Roosevelt.,
Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin during the Tripartite Conference held in October 1943 (released on November 1,
1943), contained a warning, addressed to Nazi troops and to Nazi
officials, of the punishment which would befall those who would
be found guilty of crimes in the occupied countries of Europe.
The Declaration was made "in the interests of the (then) thirtytwo United Nations" and contained a reference to what was
planned for the punishment of ordinary participants in the perpetration of atrocities. A special provision stipulated that the
Declaration was "without prejudice to the case of the major
criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies." Evidently, the Soviet Delegation at the
Conference based its insistent argumentation on this (final)
paragraph of the Moscow Declaration when it became apparent
that the Russians desired to put more emphasis on political executive action than on orthodox judicial procedure, so far as the
trial of the major war criminals was concerned. See also Sidney
S. Alderman, loc. cit., 103, as to the ambiguity of the expression
"joint decision." For an Analysis of this Declaration, see John
V. Barry, The Moscow Declaration on War Crimes, 17 AUST.
L. J. 248 (1943).
75. ICMT, 104 ff.
76. Gen. Nikitchenko (ICMT, 105) was probably referring to that
part of the report of the Crimea Conference (February 11, 1945)
which dealt with the "Occupation and Control of Germany" and
contained the characteristic phrase (in the second paragraph of
that section " . . . bring all war criminals to just and swift
punishment . . . " See SEN. Doc. No. 8, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3
(1945), Crimean Conference (Report), U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D. C. See also John P. Kenny, op. cit., supra,
12, 13.
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The Soviet representatives also pointed out that those
pronouncements declared the immediate carrying-out of
the just punishment of the men who had committed atrocities."
As was to be expected, such a position was held to be
incompatible with the Western concepts of the Independent
function of a court which is free to decide on the question
of guilt or innocence of a defendant, using evidence and
law as its criterion in that direction and not political commands issued by the government. Justice Jackson explained
at length,"8 and, with indicative pointedness, that the con77.

ICMT, 104,105. The essence of this was that the Soviet Delegation supported the idea of instituting a court to sanction what,

in fact, would have been political executions and not judicial
trials. The Russian jurists held the position that the court which
was to be set up should consider itself bound by the Moscow
Declaration (Nov. 1, 1943) that the Nazis were criminals and
that it had to weigh "the personal guilt of each only as a basis
for sentencing him" (Justice R. H. Jackson, Niremberg in RetroRpect, XXVII CAN. B. REV. 761,767 (1949). Gen. Nikitchenko
developed the Soviet position as follows: "The definition of
'war crimes' was set forth in the Moscow and Crimea Declarations, and it is our opinion we should act on those declarations. If we turn once again to the terms of the Moscow Declaration, we see that apparently the conception of what is a war
criminal is quite clear." ICMT, 298.
78. "I think we are in a philosophical difference," observed Justice
Jackson, "that lies at the root of a great many technical differences and will continue to lie at the root of differences unless we
can reconcile our basic viewpoints. As the statement of our Soviet
colleague said, they proceed on the assumption that the declarations of Crimea and Moscow already convict these parties and
that the charges need not be tried before independent judges empowered to render an independent decision on guilt . . . In the
first place the President of the United States has no power to
convict anybody. He can only accuse. He cannot arrest in most
cases without judicial authority. Therefore, the accusation made
carries no weight in an American trial whatever. These declarations are an accusation and not a conviction. That requires a judicial finding. Now we could not be parties to setting up a mere formal judicial body to ratify a political decision to convict. The
judges will have to inquire into the evidence and reach an independent decision. There is a great deal of realism in Mr. Nikitchenko's
statement. There could be but one decision in this case-that
we are bound to concede. But the reason is the evidence and not
the statements made by the heads of state with reference to these
cases. That is the reason why, at the very beginning, the posi-
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sideration of what amounted to "political executions"" was
completely out of the question. The acceptance of such a
course would have meant the virtual abandonment of fundamental American concepts of justice administered by a
court of law. Besides, the juridical representatives of the
Western Democracies were unanimous in their decision to
set up such a court for the trial of the Nazi war criminals
and Justice Jackson had given voice to what were generally
understood and accepted judicial prerequistes among them.
Seeing the impossibility of introducing a dominant political
overtone into the planned functions of the trial of the war
criminals, the Soviet Delegation yielded finally on this point
and accepted, rather reluctantly, the concept of the politically
independent function of a court supported by Western
theory and practice.
It should be noted here that .[usice Jackson expressed
disagreement with the Soviet idea of placing the Nazi defendants on trial by adopting a procedure which could take
on the form of a quasi-judicial trial. His argument was
that the Soviet Delegation proposals were phrased in such
a manner as to confer only jurisdiction to the projected
court to try the Nazi defendants without defining precisely
the substantive law that created the crimes of which they
were accused.'" The American representative also objected
tion of the United States was that there must be trials rather
than political executions. I took that position publicly. I have no
sympathy with these men, but, if we are going to have a trial,
then it must be an actual trial . . . " ICMT, 115.
79. It should be noted here that the question "political executions
or judicial trials" was given special attention by the American
Delegation. Sidney S. Alderman prepared a memorandum in
which he developed the thesis that the Moscow Declaration was
not a legal document but only a broad statement of policy formulated and adopted by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin and that
it did not create legal obligations; see "Memorandum on Changes
in Subcommittee Draft Desired by American Delegation, July 31,
1945," ICMT, 396,397. See also John V. Barry, loc. cit., 248.
80. ICMT, 330. Justice Jackson observed also that, if the Conference
were to issue only a statement and thereby establish jurisdiction
without making reference to applicable substantive law, "it would
be open to the tribunal, if it thought the international law was
such as to warrant it, to adjudge that, while these persons (that
is, the Nazi defendants) had committed the acts we change, these
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to the Russian standpoint that aggression, in order to be
such, had to stem from the European Axis Powers. "We
would think," said justice Jackson, that such an approach
"had no place in any definition because it makes an entirely
partisan declaration of law.""
Professor Trainin remarked something during the particular session of the Conference in which the question of aggression had caused so much controversy, that must have
been also in the minds of the other representatives; namely,
the inherently difficult task of formulating concretely the
particulars in relation to the general theme of punishing the
war criminals, on which there was unanimous agreement."
The Soviet jurist also made reference to the question of
substantive, law which Justice Jackson had brought up, although he did not volunteer a positive suggestion as to what
the substantive law should exactly be. Professor Trainin
observed further that an
"action

becomes an international crime exen though it may
be carried out in accordance with definitions of international laws
if it is done as a part of preparation of aggression or domination
over other nations.''

8

It could be said here that the representative of the Soviet
Union probably considered the determining factor, which
acts were not crimes against international law and therefore to

acquit them. That we think would make the trial a travesty."
ICMT, 330.
81. ICMT, 330. "If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes,"
continued Justice Jackson, "they are crimes whether the United
States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are
not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against
others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."
The representative of the United States also added a stern remark in the sense that Russian insistence on limiting aggression
to the "European Axis Powers" deprived the Soviet argument
"of all standing and fairness as a juridical principle." Ibid., 330.
See also, ibid. (Preface) VIII, where Jackson wrote that the
Soviet jurists finally yielded and that a generic definition was
adopted which was acceptable to all the representatives at the
Conference. See also "Notes on Proposed Definition of 'Crimes,'
submitted by American Delegation, July 31, 1945."
82. ICMT, 333.
83. ICMT, 333.
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made an action internationally criminal, to be its underlying
aggressive quality, for the warlike results of active aggression would constitute the evaluative criterion. Such an
action, although perhaps not in discordance with conventional "bourgeois" international law, would, nevertheless,
violate its very essence for it would be aimed at undermining
the peace of nations. Generally speaking, this could be
considered to be a progressive attitude, but, it must be
observed here that the Soviet Delegation would not advance
any suggestion as to the adoption of substantive rules meant
to govern the evaluation of such aggressive actions. The
reason for this attitude probably was the definite fact that
the USSR wanted to limit the context of aggression to the
actions of the European Axis Powers and emphatically declined to contribute to the examination of a suggestible
course in a different direction. Russian acquiescence to the
proposal of formulating a generalized definition of aggression could not possibly have been considered by the Soviet
jurists. It must not be forgotten that certain activities of the
USSR during the first phase of World War I1 suspiciously
resembled the same aggressive spirit the Russians desired so
fervently to punish so far as the Nazis were concerned.
The upshot of this controversy about the definition of
aggression was the inclusion of a wide, generic reference in
the carefully phrased Charter of the International Military
Tribunal which the Conference adopted. Article 6 (a) 84 of
this instrument reflected, in a rather condensed manner, the
essence of aggression as a "crime against peace" and contained the generally acceptable elements as to the characteristics of this crime on which both the West and the East
could find common ground to agree. 5
84. For the full text or Article 6(a) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, see EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT SERIES No.
472, at 4 (1946), U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washingtcn, D. C.
85. The concept of aggression as an offense "against peace" can be
traced back to Professor Trainin. In his book entitled HITLERITE
RESPONSIBILITY AND CRIMINAL LAW 33,37 (19?), translated into
English by A Rothstein, Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London (a
book which had the "editorial blessings" of A. Y. Vishinski, as
Charles Prince wrote in his book review of Trainin's work, 31
A. B. A. J. 366,368 (1945). Prince inferred from this that

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I I

Trainin's ideas must have coincided with those envisaged by the
USSR government) the Soviet jurist stated that international
crime was an "infringement of the foundations of international
communion." Trainin also pointed out that the concept of international crime should be developed on the basis of international
experience resulting from the war against Nazi Germany and
that it should be built on principles "inspired by real care for
the reinforcement of peaceful collaboration between the peoples";
Trainin, op. cit., supra,32. Thus the constructive value of peaceful
relations from an international standpoint was relatively stressed.
It must be noted here that Trainin put particular emphasis on
peace. Generally speaking, Soviet international law theory supports the view that peace can be variously menaced and also
blatantly violated by international criminal activity, stemming
from war-mongering activities that fall within the sphere of
bellicose machinations. As a consequence of such activities, the
peaceful intercourse between the various states is exposed to the
disruptive influence of predatory imperialism, which has often
erupted in flagrant attacks against peace-loving nations. It is
for these reasons that Trainin considered aggression as the most
dangerous offense against peace of the international crimes category; op. cit., supra, 37. In connection with this it must be observed
that the Lord Chancellor, Lord Powitt, who replaced Sir David
Maxwell Fyfe of the British Delegation (ICMT, 441), pointed out
at the Conference that, since there existed no international nomenclature as to aggression, the crime of aggression could be called
"crime against peace" instead of "crime of war." He also stated
that he was basing his argument on the terminology contained
in Trainin's book. No objections to this proposal were raised by
the other representatives of the Western Democracies; ICMT,
416,17. The discussion which arose out of the quest for the exact
meaning of this kind of crime became rather snarled up because
Trainin's elaborations and views (based on his book which the
non-Russian representatives at the Conference had read in its
English translation) did not find unopposed reception. Trainin's
book shows traits of a progressive, pioneering spirit which is
somehow damped by self-consistent political considerations. These
considerations could not be easily accepted by the Western jurists,
although an open-minded attitude existed among them. Justice
Jackson once pointed out that no progress was being made
towards reaching an agreement; "we tried very hard in defining
crimes, which is a very difficult and technical subject, to adopt
definitions consistent with the views of Professor Trainin as we
understood them from his book"; ICMT, 379. The tension which
was in the air was expressed earlier by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe
who told his colleagues at the conference that a final effort should
be made "to see what concessions we are all prepared to make and
get agreement before the announcement to a desolate world that
we have failed to come to an agreement on a question on which
we all have the same designs." Ibid., 381.
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Vt.

SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE MATTER OF THE
CRIMINALITY OF ORGANIZATIONS

The American Delegatioin had advanced a proposal according to which an appropriate procedure should be
adopted for declaring the Nazi organizations to be criminal
associations. After the criminality of these bodies had been
established, it was held suggestible to proceed to the trial
of individual members of such Nazi organizations." The
Soviet jurists expressed disagreement with this proposal. 7
Their basic arguments revolved around the concept that

Soviet criminal law did not provide for the trial of anybody
who was not a "physical person."88 The Soviet Delegation
86.

87.

Such a proposal was originally contained in the "American
Memorandum Presented at San Francisco, April 30, 1945," See.
II, 2; see ICMT, 28, 29,30. See also later formulation in "Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement, June 14, 1945,"
See. 10 (first part) in ICMT, 55, 57. See also ICMT (Preface)
VII.
See "Comments and Proposals of Soviet Delegation on American Draft, June 28, 1945"; § 5; see ICMT 92, 93. See also

Justice Jackson's observations on the Russian rejection of the

88.

possibility of trying organizations and his remarks as to whether
the Nazi organizations had a legal status after the German surrender; Ibid., 129, 130.
ICMT, 239 (Professor Trainin). Gen. Nikitchenko had expressed
himself similarly at an earlier session (July 2, 1945, 129 ff.).
"Soviet criminal law is based on the fact of the individual criminal responsibility of the individual person. It is immaterial
whether he committed some action alone or as a part of a gang;
he has to carry individual responsibility for the action he has
committed, one way or another"; ICMT, 135. Gen. Nikitchenko's
lengthy statement in connection with the implications of the
Soviet position should be spiecially mentioned here for it represents the key to the Russian legal-philosophical approach in this
matter. "Soviet law, criminal law, fully recognizes in exactly the
same way as the French, and probably others, the collective responsibility of members of an organization for the crimes committed by the organization. The theory of Soviet criminal law
fully recognizes the trial of gangs or organizations and the responsibility of the members of such organizations in addition to
any individual responsibility they may carry for individual acts.
Where we do not agree is in the idea that the trial of organizations should form actually the basis of the agreement for the
trial of criminals. An organization is not a physical body, but
the neunibei-s of that organization are physical, and, if they have
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considered it impracticable to attribute to the Nazi organizations the guilt of their members without first examining the

personal degree of responsibility of the latter. The Russian
representatives thought it advisable to conduct first an investigation of the actions of the individual adherents of
the organizations in question and establish the factual

criminality of their acts by virtue of their membership.

9

'he involved basic issue in his controversy was the fact
that Soviet criminal law is based on the individual responsibility of the actor (the criminal) with due consideration of

the whole context of his psychological set-up."

Professor

'lrainin developed relatively the point that in criminal law
"it is necessary to bring home the responsibility to individual
persons and not to condemn organizations."'"
Under these circumstances it appeared momentarily rather

problematic whether an all-around solution could be found
which would satisfy the procedural concepts of both East
committed individual crimes as members of the organization,
then they should be tried individually as physical persons who
have committed acts because they were members of a criminal
organization. In order to establish the criminal nature of the
criminal actions of the organizations, in the opinion of the Soviet
Delegation, it is necessary to investigate the actions of individuals of the organization and to establish the fact that they
have committed criminal acts by virtue of their adherance to
the organization." ICMT, 134. See also Ibid., 135 (Gen. Nikitchenko).
89. "How otherwise can we establish that the organization has in fact
committed criminal acts unless we are able to prove whether individuals belonging to it have committed such crimes?" (Gen.
Nikitchenko), ICMT, 134.
90. See note 25, in fine.
91. He added, however, that "this does not in the least prevent the
conviction of a person for adherance to or membership in a criminal organization, and the Soviet law provides for the trial of
gangs or criminal associations, and it also provides for the trial
of an individual for being a member of a criminal organization."
ICMT, 139. It is interesting to note in this connection that the
so-called "Polish diversionists" were charged before the Military
Collegiuni of the Supreme Court of the USSR with crimes covered by Articles 58 (6), 58 (8), 58 (9), and 58 (11) which provide
for the punishment of criminal organizations; see Trial of the
Polish Diversionists, heard before the Military Collegium of the
Supreme Court of the USSR, June 18-21, 1945; Verbatim Report,
English translation, Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London (19?).
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and West. Professor Andre Gros" of the French Delegation
finally came up with a suggestion which was generally considered acceptable to all. The French jurist supported the
idea that there existed an implication that the prosecution of
individual defendants who had adhered to these associations
could be understood to mean accusation for active membership in the Nazi organizations. Gen. Nikitchenko readily
agreed with this suggestion. The representative of the
Soviet Union stated also that:
"You are going to try the organization as a representative body,
but you are going to try it really in the person of its members.
If a member is found whose guilt consist in being a member, then
you have declared that the organization itself is criminal." '

92. See ICMT, 216; Professor A. Gros was, according to Justice
Jackson, a "distinguished scholar of French jurisprudence and
international law"; Ibid. (Preface), XI, XII.
93. ICMT, 216,217.

